In March 2009, President Barack Obama said, "If there is a way of getting this done where we're driving down costs and people are getting health insurance at an affordable rate, and have choice of doctor, have flexibility in terms of their plans, and we could do that entirely through the market, I'd be happy to do it that way." This paper explains how letting workers control their health care dollars and tearing down regulatory barriers to competition would control costs, expand choice, improve health care quality, and make health coverage more secure.
First, Congress should give Medicare enrollees a voucher and the freedom to choose any health plan on the market. Vouchers would be meanstested, would contain Medicare spending, and are the only way to protect seniors from government rationing.
Second, to give workers control over their health care dollars, Congress should reform the tax treatment of health care with "large" health savings accounts. Large HSAs would reduce the number of uninsured Americans, would free workers to purchase secure health coverage from any source, and would effectively give workers a $9.7 trillion tax cut without increasing the federal budget deficit.
Third, Congress should break up state monopolies on insurance and clinician licensing. Allowing consumers to purchase health insurance licensed by other states could cover one-third of the uninsured without any new taxes or government subsidies.
Finally, Congress should reform Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program the way it reformed welfare in 1996. Block-granting those programs would reduce the deficit and encourage states to target resources to the truly needy.
The great advantage of a free market is that innovation and more prudent decisionmaking means that fewer patients will fall through the cracks.
Introduction
In March 2009, at the outset of his effort to overhaul America's health care sector, President Barack Obama told a White House summit:
If there is a way of getting this done where we're driving down costs and people are getting health insurance at an affordable rate, and have choice of doctor, have flexibility in terms of their plans, and we could do that entirely through the market, I'd be happy to do it that way. 1 This paper explains how a free market can and would control costs, expand choice, improve health care quality, and make health coverage more secure. The key steps that would move America toward a free health care market are Medicare, tax, and regulatory reforms that give consumers control over their health care dollars and free them to choose from a wide variety of providers and health plans.
At present, America's health care sector is far from a free market. Government directly controls nearly half of all health care spending, and indirectly controls most of the remainder. 2 Government controls more than half of the nation's health insurance dollars (through Medicare, Medicaid, and other public programs), and delegates control over another third to employers through the preferential tax treatment granted to employersponsored health insurance. 3 The federal government imposes an average tax penalty of more than 40 percent on the one market that offers a wide range of health plans and seamless coverage between jobs: the "individual" market, where consumers purchase coverage directly from insurers. (Indeed, that tax penalty may explain much public dissatisfaction with the individual market. 4 ) More than half of U.S. health care spending takes place under government price and exchange controls. As President Obama's economic adviser Larry Summers reminds us, "Price and exchange controls inevitably create harmful economic distortions. Both the distortions and the economic damage get worse with time." 5 That is to say nothing of the countless counterproductive regulations that government imposes on clinicians, insurance, medical products, and health care facilities. 6 As health economist Victor Fuchs explains, most leading health care reforms "aim at cost shifting rather than cost reduction." 7 Whereas the legislation that President Obama is shepherding through Congress attempts to cover the uninsured by pouring more resources into health care, a free market would get more out of America's health care sector. Letting Americans control their health care dollars and breaking up the states' monopolies on insurance and clinician licensing (with "regulatory federalism") would put access to health care within reach of millions of Americans by putting downward pressure on health care prices and health insurance premiums. Those reforms would also dramatically improve quality by allowing various health plans, with various payment systems and delivery systems, to compete on a level playing field.
Controlling Costs
Health care spending is growing unsustainably. Over the past 30 years, health care spending has grown more than 2 percentage points faster than the economy overall, 8 and now stands at 18 percent of GDP. 9 That would not be a problem if we were getting our money's worth. The most credible estimates, however, suggest an alarming one-third of health care spending does nothing to make patients healthier or happier. 10 In 2009, Americans will waste more than $800 billion-about 6 percent of U.S. GDPon medical care that provides zero benefit to patients. Americans will waste additional billions on services whose benefits are not worth the cost. That wasteful spending results in higher taxes, higher health insurance premiums, and more uninsured Americans. 
Government Failure
Government is largely incapable of eliminating wasteful health care spending, because nobody spends other people's money as carefully as they spend their own. Government tax and entitlement policy denies patients ownership of their health care dollars, and thereby strips them of any incentive to control costs. Due to federal tax policy, for example, Stanford University health economist Alain Enthoven estimates that "less than 5 percent of the insured workforce can both choose a health plan and reap the full savings from choosing economically." 11 Indeed, consumers resist efforts to eliminate wasteful spending, and with good reason. Since they are enjoying health insurance that is effectively purchased with other people's money, consumers receive no direct financial benefit from eliminating wasteful spending, whether through cost-sharing or care management. When Medicare tries to eliminate coverage of low-value services or to reduce excessive provider payments, seniors experience nothing but pain. Workers perceive increased cost-sharing or managed-care controls as cuts in their compensation. Even though these steps should ultimately lead to higher wages and lower taxes, those benefits are not salient to seniors and workers. 12 That lack of cost-consciousness creates what author David Goldhill describes as "an accidental collusion between providers benefiting from higher costs and patients who don't fully bear them." 13 Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle writes that this results in a politically powerful "patientprovider pincer movement" that blocks efforts to reduce wasteful spending.
14 The patientprovider pincer movement prevents Medicare from considering cost-effectiveness when deciding whether to cover particular services; repeatedly eliminates funding for federal agencies that conduct comparative-effectiveness research; 15 preserves excessive Medicare payments for specialists, insurers, and procedures; blocks competitive bidding for durable medical equipment in Medicare; has made a joke out of the scheduled "sustainablegrowth-rate" cuts to Medicare physician payments; and even curtails private-sector efforts to eliminate wasteful spending with managedcare controls.
The end result is that both governmentand employer-sponsored insurance waste money in ways that consumers spending their own money never would. If the health reform legislation currently before Congress becomes law, politicians and employers will continue to control Americans' health care dollars, and this government failure will persist.
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The Free-Market Alternative A free market, in contrast, would eliminate wasteful health care spending. Individuals would control their own health care dollars and would therefore benefit directly from reducing waste. A less-regulated market would also free Americans to choose from a wide variety of health plans and providers.
When consumers own and control their health care dollars-in particular, the money that purchases their health insurance-the selfinterest of hundreds of millions of Americans will lead them to choose health plans that eliminate wasteful spending, whether through cost-sharing or care management, in exchange for lower premiums. Peter Orszag, President Obama's director of the Office of Management and Budget, testified before Congress on the promise of individual ownership:
Workers may demand less efficiency from the health system than they would if they knew the full cost that they pay via forgone wages for coverage or if they knew the actual cost of the services being provided. 17 [I]magine what the world would be like if workers [understood] that today it was costing them $10,000 a year in take-home pay for their employer-sponsored insurance, and that could be $7,000 and they could have $3,000 more in their pockets today if we could relieve these inefficiencies out of the health system. Making those costs more 18 Consumers who own the money they are spending are a cornerstone of free and functional markets. A free market would reduce wasteful spending with minimal harm because, unlike price controls and other tools of government rationing, 19 markets allocate resources according to consumer preferences, rather than the preferences of politicians, government bureaucrats, or special-interest lobbyists.
Restoring individual ownership to health care will require a two-pronged strategy.
Medicare Reform
For Americans covered by Medicare, Congress should give enrollees a voucher and let them choose any health plan available on the market. 20 To ensure that all beneficiaries can afford a basic health plan, Medicare should give larger vouchers to poorer and sicker seniors and smaller vouchers to healthy and wealthy seniors, using current health-riskadjustment mechanisms 21 and Social Security data on lifetime earnings. 22 The amount of each individual's voucher must be fixed, so that enrollees who want to purchase comprehensive coverage would have to pay more for it. Likewise, if a Medicare enrollee chooses an economical policy, she could save the balance of her voucher in an account dedicated to out-of-pocket medical expenses. When enrollees bear the added cost of comprehensive coverage, and reap the savings from more economical coverage, their self-interest will lead them to select health plans that curb wasteful spending. Letting seniors make their own rationing decisions is the only way to protect seniors from government rationing.
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Tax Reform
In the film Sicko, director Michael Moore took five Ground Zero rescue workers to Cuba, where they received "free" treatment for the ailments they contracted during the 9/11 rescue effort. All five had employersponsored insurance on September 11, 2001, but lost their coverage when they subsequently lost those jobs. 24 Had they been free to purchase coverage directly from an insurance company without penalty, Moore would have had more difficulty finding sick, uninsured Americans.
To give people under age 65 the freedom to control their health care dollars without penalty, Congress must reform the tax code. Employer-provided health insurance currently receives favorable tax treatment compared to health insurance that consumers purchase directly. That tax preference reduces the aftertax price of employer-sponsored insurance by 30 percent on average, which is the equivalent of imposing a 42-percent tax penalty on coverage purchased directly from an insurance company. As a result, some 163 million nonelderly Americans obtain coverage through an employer, while only 18 million purchase coverage directly from an insurance company. 25 The "tax exclusion" for employer-sponsored insurance encourages wasteful health spending by also distorting the after-tax price of medical services relative to other uses of income. 26 This supposed tax "break" for employersponsored health insurance actually operates more like a tax hike, because it denies workers control over a large portion of their earnings as well as their health care decisions. To obtain this tax break in 2009, workers with self-only coverage sacrificed control over more than $4,000 of their earnings to their employers, while those with family coverage sacrificed control of nearly $10,000, on average. 27 Analysts typically call those amounts the "employer contribution" to the cost of health benefits, yet economists agree that employers fund those contributions by reducing workers' wages. 28 In other words, that money is part of each worker's earnings, but the worker does not and cannot control it. This tax break also largely confines workers' coverage choices to the few (if any) options their employer offers. In 2008, 80 percent of covered workers had at most two health insurance options; 47 percent had only one option. 29 
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Medicare vouchers are the only way to protect seniors from government rationing.
The tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance therefore creates a health insurance "market" that largely resembles a government program. Much like a tax, it denies workers control over their earnings. Much like a government program, it empowers agents-that is, employers-to determine whether consumers will have a choice of health plans, and what those choices will be. As with government programs, federal nondiscrimination rules effectively impose price controls that prohibit insurance premiums from varying according to risk.
Returning those earnings to the workers requires reforming the tax code so that all health insurance-whether purchased through an employer or directly from an insurerreceives the same tax treatment. For example, replacing the current tax exclusion with either health-insurance tax credits, 30 a standard deduction for health insurance, 31 or large health savings accounts 32 would level the playing field between employment-based coverage and other sources of health insurance. Absent any tax preference for employer-sponsored coverage, workers could demand that employers give them their $4,000 or $10,000 as cash, and could use those funds to purchase coverage from any source. A competitive labor market would force employers to comply. 33 All of which means that eliminating the tax preference for job-based insurance would be an enormous tax cut. First and most obvious, the above-mentioned tax reforms would provide tax breaks to all individuals, regardless of where they purchase health insurance. Those reforms would therefore deliver tax relief to individuals who purchase insurance outside an employment setting, and who currently receive no tax break.
Second, and less obvious, eliminating the tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance would result in a massive tax cut for workers with employer-sponsored insurance, because each insured worker would gain control over $4,000 or $10,000 of her earnings that she currently does not control. In 2007, employers contributed more than $532 billion to employee health benefits. In the prior 10 years, aggregate employer contributions grew at an average rate of 8 percent. Assuming that they continue to grow at that rate through 2019, employer contributions to employee health benefits will total $9.7 trillion over the next 10 years. 34 Eliminating the tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance would therefore shift control over more than $532 billion each year, and $9.7 trillion over the next 10 years, from employers to workers. That effective $9.7 trillion tax cut would not increase the federal budget deficit, and it would more than swamp any small, explicit tax increases that altering the existing tax treatment of employer-sponsored insurance would impose on some insured workers. 35 Unlike other tax reforms, Large HSAs would deliver that tax cut immediately and with greater transparency.
Workers would receive that tax cut even if employers immediately dropped their health benefits. An employer who did not cash out its workers would lose those workers to competing firms who either continue to offer health benefits, or who pay workers the cash equivalent of those health benefits. The CBO writes:
To be sure, workers' cash compensation might not increase immediately by the full amount of any reduction in employers' payments for health insurance. For that reason, firms that currently contribute toward the costs of their workers' health benefits could temporarily reap some savings in labor costs. 36 But those savings would not be permanent, because a competitive labor market would force those firms to pay workers the full value of those cancelled health benefits. Again, Large HSAs would make that tax cut immediate and transparent, and all but eliminate the incentive for employers to capture that short-term gain.
Eliminating the tax preference for employersponsored insurance would also expand consumers' health plan choices. Workers would be 5 Eliminating the tax preference for job-based insurance would be an enormous tax cut totaling $9.7 trillion over the next 10 years.
free to remain with their company's health plan. Yet they would no longer be confined to the few (if any) choices their employer offers. They could choose any health plan available on the market, including plans with varying benefits, cost-sharing structures, delivery systems, and payment systems. Consumers who value greater physician choice, but who are currently locked into closed-panel managed-care plans, could select a fee-for-service plan. Consumers who value lower premiums more than physician choice could do the reverse.
In the process, consumers' self-interest would eliminate wasteful spending. The Congressional Budget Office writes that "with a fixed-dollar tax credit or deduction . . . employees would capture more of the savings from choosing a cheaper plan. As a result, the CBO estimates that people would ultimately select plans with premiums that are between 15 percent and 20 percent lower than the premiums they would pay under current law." 37 Unlike government efforts to ration medical care, consumers would curb spending in ways that fit their individual preferences.
Medicare reform and tax reform would further reduce costs by spurring greater competition between health plans and providers. With seniors choosing from a menu of private health plans, the market would no longer operate under the stranglehold of Medicare's feefor-service price and exchange controls. Greater competition would put downward pressure on prices for medical services. Provider competition would also grow as cost-conscious consumers make greater use of mid-level clinicians for basic care, such as through retail clinics and other settings.
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Answering the Critics
Few dispute that letting consumers control their health care dollars would reduce wasteful health care spending. The most common criticism of individual ownership is that consumers would restrain spending too much; that many consumers would skimp on care, leading to higher costs down the road. Research suggests that is not the case. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment showed that either cost-sharing or care management can reduce wasteful health care spending without harming overall health.
39 Individual ownership and greater competition could even improve health by expanding access to health plans that emphasize preventive care, coordinated care, information technologies (including electronic medical records), medical-error reduction, and comparative-effectiveness research. 40 Critics also fear that, in the transition from the current tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance to a level playing field, some workers with high-cost illnesses would be unable to obtain coverage. If enough workers leave an employer's health plan for the individual market, the employer may have to drop its health benefits. The sickest people in those pools would then have difficulty purchasing coverage on their own.
For several reasons, this serious concern should not be an obstacle to letting workers control their own money. First, thousands of workers are already losing their employersponsored insurance with every passing day, because employers are either dropping coverage or eliminating jobs. 41 Many have expensive illnesses and are subsequently unable to purchase coverage. They generally receive no tax breaks to help them purchase private health insurance. Tax reform would assist those workers by reducing the after-tax cost of coverage for everyone who purchases insurance on the individual market.
Second, the freedom to purchase health insurance directly from an insurance company-coverage that stays with consumers between jobs-will guarantee that fewer Americans would find themselves in such dire straits. Economists Mark Pauly and Robert Lieberthal found that, for people with highcost illnesses, the individual market provides coverage as secure as, or more secure than, job-based coverage: "a young male high risk who initially had small-[employer] coverage faces a 44 percent chance of becoming uninsured . . . a risk nearly twice as great as it would be if he initially had individual insurance." 42 
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The individual market provides coverage as secure as, or more secure than, job-based coverage.
Third, the individual market does a better job of providing health insurance to the sick than conventional wisdom suggests. Pauly, Susan Marquis of the RAND Corporation, and their respective colleagues find that there is significant subsidization of the sick by the healthy in the individual market, and that such pooling increases over time. 43 Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Marquis and colleagues find that in California's individual market, "a large number of people with health problems do obtain coverage." 44 Fourth, the above-mentioned tax reforms would put relatively more money in the hands of workers with higher medical costs. Economists consistently find that cash wages adjust downward to account for the higher costs that older, 45 obese, 46 and female 47 employees impose on an employer's health plan. Put differently, workers with costly medical conditions accept lower wages than they could otherwise command, in order to obtain health benefits.
Those workers would therefore receive the biggest tax cuts after eliminating the tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance. The fact that those workers currently accept lower wages than they could otherwise command means that they would generally receive more than the average $4,000 or $10,000 annual cash-out. A free market would therefore do exactly what so-called "risk-adjustment" schemes attempt to do: target resources to the people who need them most. Whereas President Obama and congressional Democrats have proposed taxing high-cost health plans, which would hit older, unionized, and female workers the hardest, 48 eliminating the tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance would give those workers the most tax relief. Unlike other tax reforms, which would delay that tax cut, Large HSAs would deliver those resources to sick workers immediately. To the extent that those workers are at a higher risk of losing their jobs and their coverage because they fall ill, the freedom to purchase secure, portable coverage is likewise more valuable to them than to other workers.
Finally, Large HSAs would go even further by extending the same tax relief to the uninsurable as to those who purchase insurancesomething that no other tax reform proposal would do.
Affordable Coverage and a Choice of Doctors and Health Plans
Making health insurance more affordable requires more than giving consumers control over their health care dollars. Government regulations drive health care costs higher by blocking competition from more-efficient providers, insurance plans, delivery systemsand even more-efficient regulators. Reforming insurance and clinician regulation with "regulatory federalism" would make health insurance more affordable, as well as expand the freedom to choose one's own doctor and health plan.
Monopolistic Insurance Licensing
State health-insurance licensing is a prime example of costly regulation. Each state requires insurers to obtain a license from that state's government in order to sell insurance within that state's borders. Those laws effectively give each state a monopoly over providing consumer protections to insurance purchasers because they prevent employers and individuals from purchasing health insurance licensed and regulated by other states. 49 Some form of regulation is necessary to ensure that health insurers keep their commitments to their enrollees. Yet monopolistic insurance-licensing laws may be more harmful than helpful. Those laws give government the power to dictate the terms of every health insurance policy sold in the state-a power that is inevitably captured by the health care industry.
As a result, state insurance-licensing laws require consumers to purchase coverage for an average of 42 specific types of health serviceswhether the consumer wants that coverage or not. 50 Some states also use insurance-licensing laws to enact price controls that tax healthy consumers to subsidize the sick. Those price-Some form of regulation is necessary. Yet monopolistic insurancelicensing laws may be more harmful than helpful.
control laws typically do little to increase risk pooling, 51 but they do create perverse incentives for insurers to avoid the sick 52 and can cause insurance markets to unravel. 53 Physicians have used insurance-licensing laws to protect their incomes from market forces that would otherwise make health care more affordable. 54 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that state health insurance regulations increase health insurance premiums by 15 percent on average. 55 Eliminating just half of that burden could save families $1,000 or more on their premiums.
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Monopolistic Clinician Licensing
Regulation increases health care costs by blocking competition between clinicians as well. 57 As with insurance, each state requires clinicians to obtain a license from that state's government in order to practice within its borders. Those clinician-licensing laws define a "scope of practice" for each type of mid-level clinician, such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants. Those laws give government the power to decide what tasks each type of clinician may perform. Again, that power is inevitably captured by the health care industry-in this case, by competing clinicians, especially physicians.
Clinicians' scopes of practice are a perennial battleground for clinician groups who try to block competition for their members by narrowing the range of services that competing clinicians perform, or the settings in which they practice. Ophthalmologists use licensing laws to prevent optometrists from performing surgical procedures. Anesthesiologists use licensing laws to block competition from nurse anesthetists. Physicians use licensing laws to prevent podiatrists from treating the ankle, 58 as well as to restrict nurse practitioners' ability to prescribe drugs and operate retail clinics. 59 Physicians have even used clinicianlicensing laws to block competition from health insurers that contain costs by making more extensive use of mid-level clinicians (e.g., physician assistants, nurse practitioners).
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There is ample evidence that clinician-licensing laws have increased costs by blocking competition, yet there is little or no evidence that such laws have made patients any healthier. 61 Some type of regulation is necessary to prevent clinicians (including physicians) from practicing beyond their competence. Like monopolistic insurance licensing, however, monopolistic clinician licensing appears to be an inadequate and even counterproductive form of regulation.
Break up Regulatory Monopolies
Consumer protections are ultimately a product. Like all monopolies, the monopolies that state governments hold over licensing clinicians and insurers produce highcost, low-quality consumer protections. The most promising way to spur cost-saving competition between clinicians and insurers is to break up those monopolies and force regulators to compete to provide the best set of consumer protections.
With regard to insurance, that means preventing states from using their insurancelicensing laws as a barrier to entry for insurance products licensed by other states. An employer or consumer in Michigan, for example, should be allowed to purchase an insurance policy licensed in Connecticut or any other state, so that the only insurance regulations that would govern that relationship would be Connecticut's. Those regulations could be incorporated into the insurance contract, so that the purchaser could enforce Connecticut's consumer protections in Michigan courts, even with the help of Michigan's insurance commissioner. 62 (States courts frequently enforce other states' laws already. 63 ) Allowing state-issued insurance licenses to cross state lines would make insurance more affordable. It would give employers and individual purchasers the freedom to choose only the coverage and regulatory protections they want, and to avoid unwanted regulatory costs. A study by Stephen Parente and colleagues at the University of Minnesota estimated that ending those regulatory monopolies could cover an additional 17 million Americans, or one-third of the most commonly cited estimate of the uninsured. 64 Eliminating both types of regulatory monopoly would force states to compete to provide the protections that consumers demand, while avoiding unwanted regulatory costs. States that want to collect licensing fees and premium taxes would face powerful incentives to find the "right" amount of regulation-not too much and not too little-much like Delaware has made itself the go-to state in the market for corporate chartering laws.
Ideally, state legislatures would take the lead by recognizing the clinician and insurance licenses issued by other states. Yet Congress can act as well, using its powers under the Commerce Clause to tear down these barriers to trade between the states.
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"Regulatory federalism," as it is called, would expand the array of health-insurance and medical-delivery choices available to consumers-particularly by allowing competition from more efficient providers and health plans that states' regulatory monopolies hold at bay.
Answering the Critics
Critics fear that breaking up states' regulatory monopolies would spur states to gut essential consumer protections in an effort to capture health insurance premium taxes and clinician licensing fees. The result would be a "race to the bottom" where fly-by-night insurance companies and incompetent clinicians do harm to patients.
Yet political factors and competitive market forces would prevent a race to the bottom by restoring vital consumer protections. Suppose that Delaware gutted its consumer protections and began issuing licenses to sketchy insurers and clinicians, in the hope of collecting lots of premium taxes and licensing fees. Could Delaware get away with it? Not likely. First, some of those insurers and clinicians would inevitably harm Delaware residents, who would demand that their politicians restore those essential consumer protections. Second, competitors would discipline the low-quality clinicians and health plans licensed by Delaware. Higher-quality insurers and clinicians would advertise their credentials, including the fact that they comply with the stronger consumer protections demanded by other states. Third, courts in other states would deter Delaware-licensed insurers and clinicians from bad behavior by enforcing contracts and punishing medical negligence. Regulatory federalism would still allow each state to set its own medical malpractice rules, which provide additional (and perhaps superior) protections against incompetent clinicians. Finally, consumers themselves would discipline low-quality insurers and clinicians after learning of Delaware's reputation through the news, Consumer Reports, and other media. Whether Delaware eliminated vital consumer protections deliberately or inadvertently, these selfcorrecting mechanisms would restore those essential consumer protections.
Critics likewise fear that allowing consumers to avoid state-imposed price controls 9 "Regulatory federalism" would allow competition from more efficient providers and health plans that states' regulatory monopolies hold at bay. on health insurance would lead health insurers to dump patients because they need expensive care. Yet markets offer protections against such behavior. First, Mark Pauly and Johns Hopkins University economist Bradley Herring find that absent price controls, insurers set premiums so as to eliminate any incentive for lowrisk consumers to avoid pooling with high-risk consumers. 68 Second, the controversy over rescissions in California's individual market demonstrates both that insurers may shirk their commitments to the sick, but also that the courts, media scrutiny, and the forces of reputation and competition check such behavior. 69 If Americans were free to choose their own health plan, the forces of reputation and competition would be even stronger (while administrative costs in the individual market would fall). 70 Third, University of Chicago economist John H. Cochrane explains that a free market would further discipline insurers by offering products that give even sick patients the freedom to flee a disreputable insurer. 71 Indeed, Cochrane explains, it is government price controls-not market forcesthat encourage insurers to avoid sick people, because price controls prevent insurers from charging enrollees a premium that covers their cost to the plan.
Monopoly-not competition-produces a race to the bottom. Regulatory federalism will drive a race to equilibrium by finding the best balance between too little regulation and too much regulation.
Helping the Needy
A free market would provide better and more affordable health insurance to more Americans, but it would not provide health insurance to every last person. Many would require subsidized health care, either because they did not purchase health insurance when they could have, or because health insurance was never within their grasp.
The first contribution that a free market would make to alleviate the suffering of the needy would be to reduce the number of Americans who find themselves unable to afford medical care. Through greater price competition and innovation, a free market would put health insurance and medical care within the reach for more low-and middleincome Americans. It would also provide more seamless and secure health insurance coverage, so that fewer Americans would find themselves sick and uninsured.
Moreover, subsidizing the needy need not disrupt the crucial progress that markets can make on reducing costs and improving quality. For example, considerable evidence suggests that government programs like Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program enroll many non-needy people who could obtain coverage on their own. 72 Better management of those programs would make more resources available for the truly needy.
Congress should build on the success of welfare reform by reforming those programs the same way it reformed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program in 1996: with block grants that give states the ability and the incentive to target those resources to the truly needy. 73 As markets make health insurance more secure and medical care more affordable, fewer people will fall into this vulnerable situation, and it will be easier to care for those who do.
Conclusion
When President Obama said, "We've got to admit that the free market has not worked perfectly when it comes to health care," 74 he was doubly correct. The free market hasn't worked perfectly, because it hasn't been given a chance to work at all.
But he was also correct in the sense that a free market would fall short of perfection. Contrary to former Vermont governor Howard Dean's assessment that Obama's reform plan is "perfect," perfection is not an option. 75 Former Senate majority leader Tom Daschle more sensibly observes, "Even if we achieve 'universal' coverage, there will be some percentage of people who still fall through the cracks." give states the ability and the incentive to target those resources to the truly needy.
The risk of health care reforms that expand government control over health care-including a new "government option," 77 mandates, 78 and price and exchange controls-is that they would further reduce innovation and lead to even less-prudent resource decisions, both of which will cause those cracks to widen. The great advantage of a free market is that it encourages innovation and more prudent resource allocations, which fills those cracks in over time. Many believe health care reform should include a government guarantee of "universal coverage," which even supporters often admit isn't universal in reality. If a free market were to save even more people from falling through the cracks, who would hesitate to support it?
At his March 2009 health care summit, Obama also said, "In this effort, every voice has to be heard. Every idea must be considered."
79 At a town hall meeting in June 2009, he said, "I'm very open-minded. And if people can show me here's a good idea and here's how we can get it done and it's not something I've thought of, I'm happy to steal people's ideas. You know, I'm not ideologically driven one way or another about it." 80 Letting consumers control their health care dollars and choose from a wide array of competing health plans and providers would make health care better, more affordable, safer, and more secure. Medicare reform, tax reform, and regulatory federalism stand ready to put those cornerstones of a free health care market in place.
They await their champion.
Notes
